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I. INTRODUCTION 
When I worked at the public defender’s office in Chicago, I found 
that stereotypes and prejudice are problems for everyone, not just the 
prosecution or the judiciary—although it was more acute there.1 I entered 
the office thinking that public defenders were liberal (which is, in my 
mind, a good thing) and thus “good” on race issues. Not so much. 
There is no person without prejudices, myself included. Let me il-
lustrate what I mean with an anecdote. I was in my tenth year or so at the 
office and a supervisor in the Homicide Task Force, which is a unit that 
represents persons accused of homicide. When I was a line member of 
the unit, I carried between twenty and twenty-nine murder cases at any 
given time, about one-quarter to one-third of which were death penalty 
cases.2 The Task Force was a vertical representation unit, which meant 
that we picked up the case and client in preliminary hearing court and 
traveled with him wherever he went. Most of the office, however, pro-
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LAWYER chs. 4 & 5 (2010). 
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homicide cases, it does not handle people facing the death penalty anymore. Christopher Wills, 
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vided horizontal representation, despite efforts to implement vertical rep-
resentation in all cases.3 Horizontal representation means that the assis-
tant public defenders are each assigned to a certain courtroom, and they 
represent all indigent folks who come into that courtroom. With such a 
large county and office,4 any other form of organization would be diffi-
cult. But one of the problems for client relations is that by the time the 
client works his way up to the felony courtroom, he has been in several 
courtrooms5 and has been represented by a number of different lawyers 
in the office. 
This situation had occurred on the day I wish to write about. As I 
mentioned, I was a supervisor, but I did not supervise the lawyer I am 
about to describe. I will call him Paul. He was a white man in his late 
forties or early fifties—a career public defender. He was back in the 
lockup talking to a client, as was I. Behind every courtroom in the crimi-
nal courts are lockups where pretrial detainees wait until their cases are 
called. This particular lockup is about fifty by twenty feet, with open bars 
so you could approach your client and speak to him through the bars with 
no obstruction. There is a “privacy panel” with a toilet toward the back. 
It isn’t very private, and you learn to ignore it and not “see” it. 
On this day, I was trying to speak to my client again about the mo-
tions we were filing and reporting to him about an investigation. Since 
these lockups are not very private—there can be as many as thirty or for-
ty men back there (usually all are men of color)—I told my client that we 
would discuss everything more when I came to see him at the jail later 
that week. But I could hardly even say that much because Paul was yell-
ing at his client nearby. From what I could gather, this client had been 
arrested later than his codefendant. Paul had worked out what he be-
lieved was an advantageous plea for the codefendant. I am sure it was a 
good plea deal, but he was meeting this client for the first time and was 
trying to strong-arm him into taking the deal, as it was apparently a 
package for either both codefendants or neither. Paul called him stupid. 
He used pejorative terms such as “mope” and “ignorant gangbanger.” He 
                                                 
 3. See ROGER PRZYBYLSKI ET AL., TRENDS AND ISSUES, 1997: ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
INFORMATION AUTHORITY 77 (1997). 
 4. “The Office of the Cook County Public Defender is the second largest public defender’s 
office in the nation, with more than 500 attorneys providing indigent defense service in the largest 
county in the State.” State of Illinois Capital Punishment Commission Members, ILL. DEP’T OF 
CORR., http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/member_info.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
 5. The defendant probably appeared in bond court, made one or more appearances in prelimi-
nary hearing court where he may have been represented by a different public defender each time, 
and also appeared in arraignment court. It is unlikely that he has been visited by a lawyer at the jail if 
he is detained (and most indigent clients cannot make bond), so the defendant often appears in the 
felony courtroom between three to six weeks later, and with only in-court representation. 
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told the client that he—the client—could “do six [years] standing on his 
head.” And worse. 
I was pretty sure that Paul would never have spoken to a white 
eighteen- or nineteen-year-old young man in the same demeaning way. 
They were both yelling at each other, and the entire lockup was listening. 
I doubt that the interaction was a product of Paul’s conscious thought, 
but it is this unconscious bias that is so difficult to address and therefore 
is the focus of this Article. 
I was not Paul’s supervisor, but I asked him to step out of the lock-
up with me. I wanted to tell him that he was being disrespectful and that 
even if this was the best deal for the client, the client had no confidence 
in Paul, and he was making it impossible for the client to maintain any 
sort of pride and accept it by fronting him off like that. I did not want to 
do the same to Paul though, so that is why I asked him to step out with 
me. He turned to me and snapped that he was busy. I told him so was I, 
and then proceeded to say everything I intended, plus I added, “Paul, this 
man is the reason you have a job. Show him some damn respect.” He 
was furious with me, and I made a permanent enemy that day. 
Later that week, I recounted this incident at a supervisors’ meeting 
and suggested that we do something about the office and what I per-
ceived to be racial attitudes coupled with the burnout that this work en-
genders. I said, “We all have prejudices—me too—but as public defend-
ers, we should try to at least know that and discount for it in some way.” 
I asked my colleagues if they thought that Paul would have perceived 
this young man as being able to do six years “standing on his head” if he 
had been white, middle-class, and from a suburb. My comments were 
dismissed as being overly sensitive (read: female), and the meeting pro-
ceeded to other matters. I looked around the room and realized that there 
were only one or two women or people of color in our ranks. Maybe that 
was the problem. 
After the meeting, one of the African-American supervisors told me 
that I “had done it now.” I asked him what he meant. “It’s one thing if I 
speak about race,” he replied. “It’s viewed as self-interest. But if you do 
it, it is viewed as betrayal.” When I went out to my car that night, both 
front tires had been slashed. I will never know for sure if it was related to 
what I said in that meeting, but I have my suspicions. 
Despite the repercussions I suffered for voicing concerns about ra-
cial biases in the work of public defenders, I will continue to advocate 
that, as defense lawyers, we must be conscious of our own racial biases, 
especially when interacting with our own clients and when selecting a 
jury through voir dire. We must not take a “color-blind” approach to our 
representation because it is in the very recognition of color that we can 
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recognize our own biases and ensure that they do not inhibit our ability 
to represent our clients. 
This Article will proceed with a discussion of race bias and will ex-
amine who in the criminal justice system has such biases. These concepts 
will provide a backdrop to the next Part, where I will turn to an analysis 
about the need for criminal defense lawyers to be conscious of race bias. 
I focus on two specific circumstances in which awareness of one’s own 
racial bias is imperative: interacting with clients and voir dire. But first, 
we must come to an understanding about the nature of race bias itself. 
II. JIM CROW IS GONE,6 SO WHY ALL THIS TALK OF RACE BIAS? 
This Part will explore the foundational concepts behind racial bias 
in the criminal justice system. It will first clarify the definition of racial 
bias and how it manifests both explicitly and implicitly in our lives. 
Next, this Part will discuss who in the criminal justice system has racial 
bias—prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike. 
A. What Is Racial Bias? 
Although overt racism is still palpable in today’s world, uncon-
scious racism and biases often play a role in our everyday decisions. Ra-
cial biases might cause us to “treat members of different racial groups 
disparately.”7 There are two different types of bias: explicit and implicit.8 
Explicit bias refers to the kinds of bias that people knowingly express 
and sometimes embrace.9 This type of bias has prompted many proce-
dural safeguards in the criminal justice system. In Batson v. Kentucky, 
for example, the United States Supreme Court held that when the defense 
believes the prosecution is exercising peremptory challenges on the basis 
of racial discrimination, the defense is permitted to object.10 If the trial 
judge finds a prima facie case of racially motivated peremptory strikes, 
the prosecution must then provide “race-neutral” reasons for the exclu-
sions.11 This safeguard is meant to discourage the explicit bias expressed 
when a prosecutor removes people of color from the jury simply because 
of their race.12 While explicit bias like this does exist within the criminal 
                                                 
 6. While overt and codified racism is gone, racism is not. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Jim 
Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004). 
 7. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 
2044 (2011). 
 8. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986). 
 11. Id. at 97. 
 12. Id. at 99. 
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justice system and is potentially the reason for some racial disparities, it 
is not the only culprit.13 
Implicit bias is also to blame, yet it is less visible. Usually, implicit 
bias is so subtle or ingrained that those who hold the bias are not aware 
of it.14 Implicit biases are especially difficult to discuss because even 
when we are in touch with them, we are unlikely to admit to or address 
our own implicit racial biases.15 This is challenging when addressing ra-
cial disparities in the criminal justice system16 because “[o]nce activated, 
implicit stereotypes and attitudes can negatively influence individuals’ 
judgments and behaviors toward racial minorities in ways that they are 
unaware of and largely unable to control.”17 Biases can influence one’s 
interpretation of benign behavior, causing one to read identical behaviors 
differently based on the race of the actor.18 
Moreover, studies have shown that we engage in “race loyalty,” as-
suming the best in people who match our race because of our desire to 
see our race (and ourselves) positively: 
[A] decision maker is engaged in what [researchers] call a form of 
“racial loyalty” in which “he attributes the more positive stereotype 
of the white person” as superior, more qualified (despite the same 
credentials), more intelligent, more deserving and more hard-
working in order “to avoid attributing negative characteristics to 
white people and himself.” To avoid lowering his own self-image, 
the racially identifying decision-maker must elevate the white ap-
plicant over the black applicant. This loyalty to other white people 
                                                 
 13. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196 (“[R]esearchers have found a marked decline in 
explicit bias over time, even as disparities in outcomes persist.”); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 88. 
 14. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196. 
 15. Id. As defined by Dovidio & Gaertner, “[M]ost whites also develop some negative feelings 
toward or beliefs about blacks, of which they are unaware or which they try to dissociate from their 
nonprejudiced self-images.” J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (2004), quoted in Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious 
Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a Measure, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 277, 278 (2008); see also JOE R. 
FEAGIN ET AL., WHITE RACISM 186–217 (2d ed. 2001) (Studies show that most whites deny they are 
racially prejudiced despite empirical evidence revealing widespread racial discrimination against 
African-Americans.); Frank M. McClellan, Judicial Impartiality & Recusal: Reflections on the Vex-
ing Issue of Racial Bias, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 351, 352 (2005) (“[W]hile race consciousness remains a 
dominant feature of the American social fabric in the 21st century, few individuals refuse to 
acknowledge that their words or conduct may reflect a racial bias.”). 
 16. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196. 
 17. Richardson, supra note 7, at 2043. 
 18. Id. 
760 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:755 
occurs in order to fulfill the individual’s quest for a positive self-
image.19 
This research alone shows the importance for all people, especially those 
in the criminal justice system, to understand racial bias and how it affects 
the conduct and opinions of the beholder. 
B. Who Has Racial Bias? 
No one is immune from racial bias. Researchers have found that 
most people, even those who embrace nondiscrimination norms, hold 
implicit biases.20 In fact, research shows that people from all racial back-
grounds “have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes and prejudices 
that can negatively and nonconsciously affect [their] behavior.”21 Thus, 
implicit bias is not just a problem for white people—people of all colors 
have racial bias, even biases toward people that look like them.22 Even 
those within marginalized groups have biases against one another be-
cause they internalize the majority’s stereotypes.23 
Legal actors are not exempt from racial bias. Numerous studies 
have detected racial bias among police officers, prosecutors, and judges. 
One study showed that police officers, like the general public, have a 
bias that “often assumes young black men are more dangerous or aggres-
sive than others.”24 Applying these implicit biases to prosecutors, they 
often assume that nonwhite jurors will be bad for their case if the de-
fendant is also nonwhite. This bias is even institutionalized in some pros-
ecutors’ offices, where prosecutors are instructed to come up with race-
neutral explanations for striking black jurors to avoid Batson challeng-
es.25 This tactic is rooted in the race-biased assumption that black jurors 
will identify with black defendants. 
                                                 
 19. Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 1077, 1086 (2008) (quoting Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspira-
cies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 82–83 (2006)). 
 20. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196; Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact 
of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 803 
(2012); Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washing-
ton’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 664−65 (2012) [hereinafter Task Force 
Report]. 
 21. Richardson, supra note 7, at 2039. This bias often assumes young black men are more 
dangerous or aggressive than others. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Smith, supra note 19, at 1087. 
 24. Richardson, supra note 7, at 2039. 
 25. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253 (2005) (“Finally, the appearance of discrimination is 
confirmed by widely known evidence of the general policy of the Dallas County District Attorney’s 
Office to exclude black venire members from juries at the time Miller-El’s jury was selected.”). 
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Even judges—legal actors who are supposed to remain the most 
unbiased and egalitarian actors in the legal system—possess racial bias-
es: 
Judges in particular want to believe that they can be fair to everyone 
and perform their duties in a colorblind manner. However, judges 
are not immune from the same racial biases affecting most Ameri-
cans. In light of this reality, efforts to identify and mitigate or elimi-
nate racial bias on the part of a judge or an attorney pose unique 
problems.26 
In another study, researchers completed a multipart analysis involving a 
large sample of trial judges from around the country.27 Researchers found 
that “judges harbor the same kinds of implicit biases as others; that these 
biases can influence their judgment; but that given sufficient motivation, 
judges can compensate for the influence of these biases.”28 While these 
findings are disheartening, they also lend hope to the idea that these bias-
es are not invisible or immutable. Actors in the legal system can 
acknowledge some of their biases and overcome them. 
During my years of trial experience, I have encountered firsthand 
the biases of these legal actors. But I have also observed racial biases in 
myself and other defense lawyers, and it usually comes with either a lack 
of awareness or a resistance to addressing these biases. As shown in the 
literature above, little has been written or discussed about the racial bias-
es of defense lawyers, and how those biases could negatively affect our 
clients if we do not acknowledge and monitor them. This Article aims to 
begin filling the gap in the discourse and to make a case for why ac-
knowledging and controlling racial biases is especially imperative for 
criminal defense lawyers. 
III. DEFENSE ATTORNEY BIAS: YES, IT IS A MORAL MATTER, AND A 
PRACTICAL ONE AS WELL 
As a defense attorney myself, I feel a responsibility to discuss and 
acknowledge our biases—if not for our own sake, then for the sake of 
our clients. This Part aims to discuss the biases we carry as defense at-
                                                 
 26. McClellan, supra note 15, at 352; see also Debra Cassens Moss, Judge Says He’s Sorry, 
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 21 (discussing Judge Arthur Cieslik, who made inappropriate comments 
to women and minorities, including saying that “women should not be lawyers”). I practiced in front 
of Judge Cieslik and was on the receiving end of some of his sexist comments. He also made racist 
comments in the Derrick Morgan case, which engendered People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. 
1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). Among some of his comments, he called the two black lawyers 
“laughing boy” and “smiling boy,” and suggested fumigating chambers after the two lawyers had 
been there. 
 27. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1195. 
 28. Id.  
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torneys and average people, specifically the biases we exhibit when in-
teracting with our own clients and when selecting a jury. 
A. Defense Attorneys Also Have Bias, Even When Most 
Clients Are People of Color 
In light of the existing research that shows the power of our internal 
biases,29 it is only natural that defense lawyers are not exempt from bias. 
The difficulty is that these biases are not necessarily salient,30 and we are 
often unaware that we have them at all. I am certain that the lawyer I 
called Paul did not and would not see his actions as having any racial 
component. I imagine he did not even see them as wrong because he 
“knew what was best for the defendant,” even if the defendant did not. 
His legal advice may have been correct, but his way of communicating 
with his client was ineffective, and the moral implications of his conduct 
were suspect at best. 
Our clients rely on us for advice, and we should give it to them. But 
we must also realize that major decisions belong to the client.31 Our best 
advice will be ignored if we cannot communicate with our clients, and 
this reality requires us to give respect as well as demand it. It also means 
that we have to understand that we may not see our clients clearly. 
We defense lawyers must be conscious of our own racial biases, or 
else our clients will suffer. As Lois Heaney stated: 
[T]he myth of “color blindness,” like all other efforts to deny the 
fact and effect of prejudice, bias and oppression, works only to the 
benefit of those who are not the object of prejudice. Denying the ex-
istence of racism . . . does nothing to correct its effects inside or 
outside the courtroom, but rather undermines and jeopardizes the 
credibility of the justice system, and serves to compound harm to 
our clients.32 
I will discuss this issue both with respect to the attorney-client relation-
ship and how it affects the process of jury selection. Through these two 
                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Rachlinski et al. supra note 8, at 1196; Smith & Levinson, supra note 20; Task 
Force Report, supra note 20. 
 30. See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Deci-
sion-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599 
(2009) (discussing bias salience). 
 31. The client gets to decide whether to testify, whether to request a jury, and what to plead. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (“In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by 
the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive 
jury trial and whether the client will testify.”). 
 32. Lois Heaney, The Case for Meaningful Voir Dire on Race and Sexual Orientation Bias, 3 
CAL. ST. B. CRIM. L.J. (2001), available at http://www.njp.com/articles/CaseForMeaningfulVoir%2 
0Dire.pdf. 
2012]  Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys 763 
examples, I will illustrate how we must address racial biases to ensure 
they do not hurt our clients or our clients’ cases. 
B. Defense Attorney Bias When Interacting with Clients 
One example of how racial bias can interfere with client communi-
cation comes, again, from my own experience. One thing that is a part of 
criminal defense work—indeed, all criminal law—is salty language. I 
have heard it, have used it myself, and have had it used toward me. 
Nonetheless, no one likes being yelled at or sworn at. On one particular 
occasion, I represented a young man in a death penalty case. He was 
about twenty, African-American, and a member of a gang. I went to the 
jail to discuss some decisions we needed to make and their consequenc-
es. We were in Division One of Cook County Jail, in what used to be the 
law library but is now denuded of books and serves as the room for at-
torney-client visits. It is in the basement, always damp, and the tables are 
like picnic tables with attached seats. I explained my client’s options and 
my assessment of the consequences of the two directions in which we 
could proceed. Suddenly, he started swearing at me and raising his voice. 
“Fuck a consequence! I don’t give a damn about no fucking conse-
quence. Fuck You!”33 I tried to continue the conversation, but that only 
made it worse. Finally, I had had enough and I left. 
Shortly after that encounter, I attended a lecture about developmen-
tal disabilities. I learned that one of the ways someone with a develop-
mental disability compensates for not being able to understand is to act 
tough to cover it. I realized that I had not been seeing “an angry black 
man.” I had been seeing someone with developmental disabilities who 
was covering it up. Many people mistakenly believe that one can merely 
look at a person and tell that he is disabled.34 In fact, there is an expecta-
tion that developmentally disabled people look like someone with Down 
Syndrome or have other facial indicia of their malady, even though most 
often this is not the case.35 
I saw the stereotype, and instead of asking myself why my client 
was angry and trying to understand his reaction, I got angry too. After I 
understood this, I learned to introduce only one new idea to this client at 
a time because that was all he could process. And the next time I had a 
                                                 
 33. I referred to this incident, albeit in much less detail, in a previous article, But He Doesn’t 
Look Retarded: Challenges to Jury Selection in the Capital Case for the Mentally Retarded Client 
Not Excluded Under Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 712 (2008). 
 34. Shruti S. B. Desai, Effective Capital Representation of the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 
13 CAP. DEF. J. 251, 266–67 (2001). 
 35. Michael L. Perlin, “Life is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. 
L. REV. 315, 334–35 (2003). 
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client yell at me in that way, I said, “Whoa, whoa. What did I say just 
now that didn’t make sense to you?” 
The work defense lawyers do is difficult and emotionally draining. 
There are many ways to handle stress, and not all of them are healthy.36 
One of them is humor. We all tell jokes in stressful situations, even at 
tragic situations or funerals. Humor relieves stress.37 But those jokes can 
also become a way to dehumanize our clients or the victims of crime, and 
they get in our way as advocates. If we do not see our clients as people 
worth voting for, how on earth will a jury? 
This insight leads me to another personal example that does not 
make me proud. I represented a deeply religious man, a fanatic even. He 
had crosses tattooed on him; he quoted from the Bible all the time, 
seemed unable to follow a logical conversation, often looked about the 
room, and appeared to be listening to something I could not hear or see 
(although, in retrospect, it might have been how he would stop to think). 
Overall, he seemed a bit crazy to me. One day, I came back to my office 
from the jail, frustrated with our inability to communicate. In that meet-
ing, I had needed to tell him some hard truths about our ability to fight 
his case, but he did not want to listen. We needed to make some deci-
sions, and he did not want to make them. So, he refused to make them, 
and then outright refused to talk to me any further about it, knocking on 
the door to be taken back to his cell. “I will leave this in God’s hands,” 
he said as he left. I was angry and told my office partner and some other 
public defenders who were around that I had “no problem with leaving 
things in God’s hands, but damn it, couldn’t God file an appearance [as 
counsel of record] so I could withdraw?” 
Everyone, including me, laughed. My comment was funny, and it 
relieved tension at the time, but it also showed that I had not listened to 
my client. I saw his religiosity as an impediment to communication, but 
if I had seen him as a person instead of a symbol of the “crazy religious 
client,” I would have realized much sooner that he wanted spiritual ad-
vice, not legal advice. Eventually, I figured it out and got a friend of 
mine, Sister Miriam Wilson,38 to speak with him. And I had to ask my-
self whether my own secular biases prevented me from helping him 
                                                 
 36. Alcoholism is a common problem in the legal profession. See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Currall, 
Note, The Cirrhosis of the Legal Profession—Alcoholism as an Ethical Violation or Disease within 
the Profession, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 739 (1999). Some programs are even aimed to help 
attorneys stop their drinking habits. See, e.g., LAWYERS’ ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://illinoislap. 
org/about-lap (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
 37. See Patty Wooten, Humor an Antidote for Stress, 10 HOLISTIC NURSING PRAC. 49, 49–55 
(1996). 
 38. Sister Miriam was a prison chaplain at the Cook County Jail for many years and worked 
tirelessly against the death penalty until her own death ten years ago. 
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sooner.39 Or, might I have seen it sooner if my client shared my demo-
graphic background—in other words, if he had been white and Jewish? I 
cannot know for sure, but I suspect the answer is yes. My biases got in 
the way of seeing what my client needed, and while this bias was only 
tangentially related to race, race was not absent. 
C. Defense Attorney Bias During Jury Selection and Voir Dire 
Another area in which our bias as defense attorneys can be especial-
ly harmful is during voir dire and jury selection. Voir dire is when our 
clients exercise their Sixth Amendment right to question potential jurors 
before trial.40 This right allows them the chance to weed out individuals 
who may hinder a fair trial.41 Defense lawyers should generally look for 
responses and attitudes that might “affect a juror’s ability impartially to 
evaluate the credibility of testimony or to draw inferences only from evi-
dence presented at trial [that] are racial and ethnic prejudices.”42 Conse-
quently, most scholarly research focuses on how attorneys can detect 
racial bias among jurors.43 The importance of the inquiry during voir dire 
is self-evident. But aside from discussing explicit racism in the context of 
Batson challenges,44 legal scholars rarely analyze the internal racial bias-
es that lawyers exhibit during jury selection. Scholars tend to overlook 
decisions of defense attorneys particularly because we tend to have 
nonwhite clients, and because of that, falsely assume that we are less 
likely to have racial bias.45 
                                                 
 39. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the 
Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1993–
94); see also Geoffrey Fatah, Man Cites Religious Bias in Murder Trial, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 3, 
2008, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695249773/Man-cites-religious-bias-in-murder-trial.html. 
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In order to place this issue in context, it is important to discuss the 
process of jury selection itself.46 Jury selection is a process of elimination 
whereby a group of potential jurors are called for jury duty, and then 
questioned and seated, excused for cause, or excused by a peremptory 
challenge by either side. Generally, a juror challenged for cause has a 
relationship with a party or witness, has some personal experience that 
would cause him to be unfair, or is otherwise legally unable to sit. De-
termining whether a juror must be removed for cause often requires some 
skills that are not necessarily comfortable for many (if not most) attor-
neys. 
As one commentator writes, “Jury selection has three main goals: 
(1) to elicit information from jurors, (2) to educate jurors on the defense 
case and defuse the prosecutor’s case, and (3) to establish a relationship 
between the jurors and the defense attorney and his [or her] client.”47 To 
further these goals, the single most important thing a lawyer can do is to 
listen. Some psychologists refer to this skill as “attending behavior,” 
which includes demonstrating a relaxed attentive posture, holding eye 
contact, and engaging in “verbal following.”48 Jury selection requires that 
the attorney ask the juror questions about the issues in the case in order 
to figure out what the juror thinks and feels, and to decide whether that 
juror can hear the case or not. 
Instead of using attending behavior to listen to potential jurors, de-
fense lawyers often rely on basic and generalized stereotypes when they 
pick juries. That is, they make assumptions based on jurors’ race, class, 
gender, and other shorthand traits. Admittedly, to some extent, we must 
rely on demographic data such as a person’s neighborhood, language, or 
background to determine how they think and feel as decision-makers. 
But because all people—lawyers, judges, and potential jurors alike—
have internal racial biases,49 when there is black defendant, prosecutors 
and defense attorneys assume that a black juror will be more sympathetic 
to the defense. In the many voir dire examinations I have done, opposing 
counsel almost always assumed that the defense wanted to keep the black 
jurors if our client was black. Such an approach, however, does not 
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acknowledge the many differences among black people in their views of 
crime and criminal justice, and ignores the fact that black people are 
more often the victims of crime than whites. 
To some extent, we must rely on the demographic data we can get 
our hands on. But stereotypes are dangerous. Perhaps because of the 
pressure of having to see a number of potential jurors in too short a time, 
many lawyers rely upon so-called “hunches” and consequently jump to 
conclusions about that juror, which have little or no basis in fact. Many 
of us, for example, have a temptation to classify people according to 
physical appearance. We may jump to the conclusion that the man with 
the square jaw is a person with great determination, or that the person 
with red hair has a hot temper, or that the individual with close-set eyes 
is not to be trusted. We all know, of course, that such conclusions have 
not the slightest validity. We are similarly trapped by our racial assump-
tions—that a black juror is good for a black defendant or that a Mexican 
juror will identify with a Puerto Rican defendant. 
If we are using this process of elimination based on stereotypes, ju-
rors will know it. And then we cannot get angry if the jurors return the 
favor by making the assumption that our young male minority client is 
guilty, a gang member, or otherwise dangerous and not deserving of re-
spect. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In articles about seemingly intractable problems like racial bias,50 
there is always a conclusion about what needs to be done, in which the 
author usually proposes more education. I am certainly in favor of more 
education, but I do not believe that it is merely education that is needed 
here. I think our focus as advocates is to develop a willingness to be in-
trospective, to face our own biases, and, as advocates, to put the client 
first. After all, as was evident on that day in the lockup with Paul, we are 
able to do this work only because of our clients. And we are all human. 
This means we are imperfect. But as legal advocates, it is our duty to 
recognize our imperfections and work to ensure that they do not harm 
our clients. We must continuously strive to recognize our own con-
sciousness so that everything we do is in their best interest. To borrow 
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from the late Michael Jackson, we need to start with the man (or the 
woman) in the mirror.51 
                                                 
 51. From the middle of the song: “I’m starting with the man in the mirror/I’m asking him to 
change his ways/And no message could have been any clearer/If you want to make the world a better 
place/Take a look at yourself, and then make a change.” MICHAEL JACKSON, Man in the Mirror, on 
BAD (Epic 1987). 
